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Flexicurity – the German trajectory 
Berndt Keller* and Hartmut Seifert**
Summary
The focus of this article is the concept of ‘flexicurity’, flexibility linked to social security. We
shall look at the issue in terms of the institutional framework in Germany and as an alterna-
tive to pure flexibilisation. The central elements are the four related concepts of (i) transition-
al labour markets, (ii) collective bargaining and working time policies which safeguard
employment, (iii) lifelong learning, and (iv) provision for old age. These can be looked at from
an analytical perspective, as well as in terms of the periods of employment and of post-employ-
ment. Furthermore, we deal with different forms of atypical employment in terms of the con-
cept of flexicurity developed here. 
❖❖❖
Sommaire
Cet article traite du concept de « flexicurité », c’est-à-dire la flexibilité liée à la sécurité socia-
le. Ce thème sera analysé sous l’angle du cadre institutionnel allemand et comme alternative
à la flexibilisation pure. Quatre concepts étroitement liés constituent les éléments importants
de cette analyse : (i) les marchés transitionnels du travail, (ii) les politiques de négociation col-
lective et de temps de travail qui préservent l’emploi, (iii) l’apprentissage tout au long de la vie,
et (iv) les dispositions en matière de pensions de vieillesse. Ces concepts peuvent être exami-
nés à la fois à partir d’une perspective analytique et en fonction des périodes d’activité profes-
sionnelle et de l’après-emploi.  Par ailleurs, différentes formes d’emploi atypique seront trai-
tées sous l’angle du concept de flexicurité développé ici.
❖❖❖
Zusammenfassung
Im Mittelpunkt des Beitrages steht das Konzept der "Flexicurity", das Flexibilität mit sozialer
Sicherheit verknüpft. Es wird hier auf die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen der
Bundesrepublik bezogen und als Alternative zur reinen Flexibilisierung diskutiert. Zentrale
Elemente bilden die vier miteinander zu verbindenden Konzepte der Übergangsarbeitsmärkte,
der beschäftigungssichernden Tarif- bzw. Arbeitszeitpolitik, des lebenslangen Lernens und der
Grundsicherung. Diese lassen sich in analytischer Perspektive sowohl auf die Erwerbs- als
auch auf die Nacherwerbsphase beziehen. Abschließend wird das hier entwickelte Konzept der
Flexicurity auf die verschiedenen Formen atypischer Beschäftigung bezogen. 
❖❖❖
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D
The problem
The further flexibilisation of employment relations is regarded as a necessary condition
of solving persistent labour market problems. These ideas, based primarily on the neo-
classical paradigm (Unabhängige Expertenkommission 1991), meet with widespread
agreement, at least in modified form (for a different opinion see: Eichhorst et al. 2001).
If, in contrast to a number of other countries, such as the UK, the proposed prescrip-
tions of further deregulation have politically been only hesitantly received in Germany,
this is because of the feared social risks which may be expected from a relaxation or even
elimination of established social standards. It is of special importance that the recent
proposals of the Hartz Commission (Bericht 2002), along with the ensuing legislation,
will have a stronger impact upon the regulatory framework than anything similar in
recent decades.
The concept of flexicurity is intended to resolve the apparent irreconcilability of flexi-
bility and social security. It has its roots in the Netherlands, where it has been developed
and implemented since the mid-1990s1. In the meantime, the OECD and the EU have
officially adopted this concept. The focal point is the concept of flexicurity, in terms of
the institutional framework in Germany, as an alternative to pure flexibilisation. In what
follows, we will use its basic principles for the benefit of the discussion in Germany, in
respect of which the point of departure is normal employment. After that we distinguish
different forms of flexibility and describe their consequences for social security (section
2). The central elements are the four related concepts of (i) transitional labour markets,
(ii) collective bargaining, especially working time policies which safeguard employment,
(iii) lifelong learning, and (iv) reform of pension systems. These are discussed in an ana-
lytical perspective and in terms of both employment and – often largely ignored in this
context – post-employment. Finally, we shall apply our general concept of flexicurity to
different forms of atypical employment which, due to their increasing spread, are receiv-
ing more and more attention in political and scholarly debates (section 4). 
Flexicurity as an alternative to deregulation
Preliminary considerations
We shall abandon the common implicit assumption of homogenous labour markets and
instead assume its segmentation according to specific criteria (such as qualifications, age
or sex of the employee, or specific market or service requirements). For that reason it is
necessary to avoid vague assertions about flexibilisation as such and to look at specific
forms of it, distinguishing between the following variants. A well-known, fundamental
distinction, which is related to the theory of the ‘new microeconomics of the labour
Flexicurity: the German trajectory
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1 With the Law on Flexibility and Security the Dutch government attempted to balance both 
aspects and ‘to improve the legal position of flexible labour while retaining flexibility’ 
(Pennings 1999: 153).
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market’ (Lindbeck and Snower 1988), differentiates in the first instance between exter-
nal and internal flexibility. Conceptual work by the OECD (1986, 1989, 1990) divides the
internal form into two further variants:2
 Internal-numerical flexibility in the case of fluctuating capacity utilisation relies 
above all on temporal adjustment of the volume of work with the help of working 
time accounts and employment-protecting working time reductions. In contrast to 
external flexibilisation (lay-offs) the number of employees can remain constant.
 Internal-functional flexibility, in the case of changing production requirements, 
relies primarily on adjustment of work organisation as well as suitably well-quali-
fied employees. These options are not available in the case of strict ‘work rules’ 
and a lack of general training, as in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
External flexibility uses above all numerical personnel adjustments through the classical
instruments of lay-offs and recruitment, along with, recently, increased fixed-term
employment and temporary work. Analogous to the differentiation between internal-
numerical and internal-functional flexibility we can distinguish two variants of external
flexibility:
 External-numerical flexibility is based on the numerical adjustment of the workforce. 
 External-functional flexibility is related to the workforce’s ability to adjust to the 
external labour market, which in turn is a prerequisite of avoiding mismatch prob-
lems in the case of structural change. 
Even if we look at this extension from a different perspective, and flexibility is no longer
regarded exclusively in terms of the enterprise, these variants can nevertheless be inte-
grated among the different forms of flexibilisation. This is substantiated by the fact that
mismatch problems also affect the potential for employment flexibility. Apart from that,
external-functional flexibility can bolster the business’s external-numerical adaptability.
Possibilities in this connection include, for example, ‘outplacement’ or ‘transfer compa-
nies’ (Transfergesellschaften) or activities of further training directed towards the exter-
nal labour market. 
Internal flexibility is more likely to provide solutions for problems of cyclical adjust-
ment, whereas in cases of permanent structural adjustment external flexibility may be
unavoidable. The choice of flexibilisation strategy favoured in an enterprise will be
determined by the skill structures of its employees. From the point of view of human
resources management those enterprises with large numbers of employees whose skills
are specifically oriented to the requirements of the enterprise are more likely to favour
Berndt Keller and Hartmut Seifert
2 Occasionally, the OECD (1986) characterises wage flexibility as another variant, which we 
will not consider in more detail. We shall not explicitly address issues of wage structure or its 
development; income adjustments are part of wage and business policy concerning employ-
ment protection. The grounds for this emphasis are supplied by empirical analyses which 
show that ‘wage and employment development in production industries have proceeded 
largely independently of one another’ (Bellmann et al. 1996: 55).
internal adjustment, whereas enterprises whose employees have more general skills will
choose external strategies. It is therefore conceivable to pursue both strategies side by
side, which could be efficient from an economic standpoint. 
External and internal flexibilisation cannot only supplement but also substitute one
another. ‘Thus, there exists a trade-off between the two types of labour flexibility, and
the precise combination of the two is governed by a host of factors. Seen in this light it
is evident also that there do not yet exist efficient models of enterprise labour flexibil-
ity’ (OECD 1986: 91). The way in which the different forms of flexibility are to be bal-
anced in order to increase labour market efficiency depends upon the prevailing busi-
ness conditions as well as general supply and demand on external labour markets
(OECD 1986: 123, OECD 1989: 77). External flexibility is restricted by legal protection
of existing employment and the adjustment costs which accompany it. Incentives to
invest in enterprise-specific skills can favour internal as against external flexibility
(OECD 1989: 76), but also the high costs of recruitment and the necessary adjustment
of newly hired employees, which vary with relative scarcity in individual labour markets. 
If this assumption of a substitutional relationship is correct – which earlier comparative
analyses seem to bear out (Sengenberger 1987) – it is a priori a matter not of the flexi-
bilisation of all, but rather of a cost-benefit and productivity-enhancing combination of
different elements of employment conditions. For this reason a variable arrangement of
working time in relation to the permanent workforce does not entail the complete aban-
donment of (limited) fixed-time or temporary employment among peripheral personnel.
The basic principle of our suggestions is to limit peripheral employment and as a coun-
termove to allow primarily internal flexibilisation in relation to core staff. 
The point of departure of the following analysis is the thesis that labour markets will in
future, on account of changed framework conditions, require a higher level of flexibil-
ity if they are to ensure efficient allocation. We shall take this assumption as a kind of
‘given’ which we shall not further analyse in what follows. For the moment it remains
open what kinds of flexibility should have priority. In addition, we shall not only distin-
guish between different variants of flexibility, but also investigate the attendant risks and
opportunities for employees. 
The components of the concept of flexicurity which we are proposing are as follows: 
 The enterprise must have adequate flexibility; the emphasis is above all on the 
internal variety. 
 The employees must be covered by social security measures, not only during but 
also after the period of gainful employment, since societal acceptance of more 
flexibility depends upon expansion of the social security system. 
 The adjustment capacity or ‘employability’ of employees on the one hand 
improves enterprise flexibility and prevents mismatching, while on the other hand 
it is in the interest of employees, since it increases their chances of adjusting to 
structural change. 
These three components should be brought together in a balanced relationship. 
Flexicurity: the German trajectory
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Our goal of optimisation would not be satisfactorily met by proposals based on pure
flexibilisation in accordance with the Anglo-Saxon model. This model, which is favoured
above all in the US, contains a large measure of (primarily external) flexibility by way of
‘hiring and firing’, though it also suffers from serious gaps as regards social security. The
frequent lack of healthcare, as well as the existence of a large group of ‘working poor’,
are among the central problems which result from this model, which relies exclusively
on the dominance of ‘market forces’ or on pure ‘flexibility’. The concept of flexicurity
provides a balance, which we shall explicate and relate to the legal and institutional sit-
uation in Germany and then put in concrete terms in the area of atypical employment
forms. 
Components of flexicurity
In our search for ways in which flexibility, which enterprises regard as necessary, can be
combined with the legitimate social security interests of employees we will borrow a
number of concepts which have recently been developed above all in the Netherlands
(Stichting van de Arbeid 1996; Wilthagen 1998; Pennings 1999) and which at present are
also making themselves felt in political debate (Riester 1999; Müller et al. 2001) and in
scientific discussion (WSI 2000; Keller and Seifert 2000; Keller and Seifert 2002;
Klammer and Tillmann 2002) in Germany3. These conceptual beginnings are partially
empirically backed and ‘clearly reflect attempts towards a new approach, in which flexi-
bility and security are considered as complementary rather than opposing concepts.
Thus, the basic aim . . . was both to make individual employment relationships more
flexible and to offer a reasonable degree of protection and stability to the workers who
are parties to such relationships’ (Ozaki 1999: 122). What is new about this is above all
the attempt to link policy fields which were hitherto organised and discussed in strict
isolation from one another, namely labour market/employment and social security4.
Centre-stage here is the recasting of the interrelationship between social security and
employment issues.
In what follows we shall describe the central elements of a model of flexicurity and their
combinations. At the same time, suitable safeguards should be designed for specific
social risks or forms of employment. The following four concepts form the basis: (i) tran-
sitional labour markets; (ii) strengthening of internal flexibility through employment-
protecting collective bargaining, especially working time policies; (iii) strengthening of
functional flexibility through lifelong learning; (iv) reform of provisions for pension sys-
tems. The first concept constitutes the point of departure – notwithstanding the itemised
critique which follows – since it is widespread in the debate on flexicurity and outlines a
general framework which makes possible the integration of other components. The last
Berndt Keller and Hartmut Seifert
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3 Recently the European Commission, among others, has argued in a similar fashion, with the 
intention of bringing ‘job security and flexibility’ into ‘a new equilibrium’ (European 
Commission 2001: 8).
4 At the same time, divisions between fields or classical disciplines, such as labour law, labour 
market and labour policy, are also melting away.
concept, in contrast to the others, concerns the post-employment phase. Its design is
growing in importance in individual calculations with regard to a social security system
increasingly oriented towards personal responsibility. Independent of this development
is the already mentioned problem of the pluralisation of employment forms. Our
critique of the concept of transitional labour markets leads to concrete examples (ii and
iii) as well as to specific extensions (iv).
Transitional labour markets
Introduction
The concept of transitional labour markets (Schmid 1994, 1999, 2000) abandons the
constitutive criterion of unlimited full-time employment, the model of standard
employment, as the exclusive reference point of employment, and tries to create smooth
transitions between employment and non-employment (the phases of gainful employ-
ment and non-gainful employment). It points up the emergence of a new type of work
(‘flexible mixed work’ as a combination of gainful employment, care work, community
work, and personal interest activities [Eigenarbeit]) in transformed labour markets which
are characterised by flexibilisation, pluralisation or individualisation and the breaking
down of the border between gainful employment and non-gainful employment. The
concept takes as point of departure a persistent lack of jobs within the framework of a
new model of full employment with smooth transitions between different forms of work. 
Transitional labour markets function in accordance with the principle of the reversibil-
ity of decision making. They make possible transitions in both directions, for instance
between full-time and part-time work or between phases of employment and non-
employment (for example, sabbaticals). Options for voluntary interruptions of employ-
ment (for example, for family reasons or for job-related or general further training) are
also institutionally available. Such a productive ‘temporary break from work’ by way of
smooth transitions between different forms of activity not only enables the realisation of
individual options in terms of life plans, but also creates support bridges in the sense of
temporary employment opportunities for outsiders who, while not attaining the status
of insiders, nevertheless become ‘entrants’ and so improve their employment opportu-
nities. 
These ‘employment bridges’ can be supported by instruments of labour market policy,
which partly have already been in use for some time (for example, transitional
allowances, short-time allowances, job creation schemes, wage subsidies), and partly
have been introduced recently (job rotation) or are still in the experimental stage, such
as ‘outplacement or transfer companies’ (Transfergesellschaften) or combined-wages
models (Kombi-Modelle).
The concept has both a quantitative and a qualitative orientation. The first relies on a
socially supported ‘redistribution of the lack’ of available jobs in periods of high
Flexicurity: the German trajectory
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unemployment. If you want to reduce the labour supply, whether temporarily or
permanently, but without stimulating demand or being able completely to eradicate the
current imbalance between labour supply and demand, then a coordinated monetary,
finance and wage policy stimulating growth remains necessary. Qualitatively, the aim is
to improve the adaptability or ‘employability’ of employees, as well as adaptability of
enterprises, thereby making it possible to cope with structural change. 
Critique
The concept of transitional labour markets has spread rapidly in recent years in institu-
tionally oriented contributions to labour market and employment policy. There has so
far been no critical debate on this fairly vaguely formulated programme, although this
would be necessary in order to further develop, improve, and concretise this innovative
and promising approach. The principal points of criticism are as follows: 
1. This concept, which is not absolutely new in every respect, has, despite a certain 
amount of ‘borrowing’ from current approaches (for example, Insider-Outsider the-
ories, especially in the form of Outsiders whom we at least might want to become
‘Entrants’), no systematic foundation in labour market theory and has so far not been
adequately operationalised. In an analytical perspective it remains fuzzy, in that it
attempts to establish a link between ‘flexibilisation’ and social protection, especially
in the gainful-employment phase, without, however, distinguishing explicitly between
different forms of flexibility. Above all, the enterprise perspective on flexibilisation
remains neglected, while the employee’s viewpoint dominates. This differentiation,
which is carried out in other analyses (OECD 1986, 1989; Bellmann et al., 1996), is,
however, necessary on a number of grounds: the above-mentioned variants of flexi-
bility not only have different cost-benefit effects and are suitable for different seg-
ments of labour markets, but they also require different means of implementation
(Sels and Van Hootegem 2001). Finally, the concept is based on a very broad notion
of ‘labour market’, which not only, in the customary sense, is aimed at different
bridges between various segments, but also includes diverse transitions into non-
market spheres (such as honorary posts or households) which ought to make possi-
ble temporary exchange. 
2. Possible employment effects, or, more concretely, contributions to reducing unem-
ployment or the achievement of a new definition of full employment, are often stud-
ied, and repeatedly also assessed (Schmid and Auer 1998: 18; Schmid 1999: 140).
Quantitative details concerning the ‘employment potential’ of the proposed meas-
ures, which surprisingly often operate with variations of working time and regul-
ations and less often with other parameters, are not comprehensible in every aspect;
they are not discretely formulated in every listed category but rather overlap. On the
whole, they are fairly optimistic or appear to be considerably overrated, which could
lead to unrealistically high expectations in relation to their possible employment
effects. 
Berndt Keller and Hartmut Seifert
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3. The concept, among other things in its stringing together of instruments, represents
rather a heuristic or classificatory scheme than an already fully developed and empir-
ically well-grounded action-concept of labour market and employment policy.
Instead of including every option it should exclude some possibilities in order to
avoid the suspicion of being an empty formula. Above all, the smooth transfer of
individual instruments which have proved themselves in other countries (for exam-
ple, the oft-cited job rotation in Denmark) in the form of best practices can run into
legal or institutional limitations or difficulties of implementation in other countries.
Solow (1990) characterises labour markets – in distinction to pure neoclassical analy-
ses, which in relation to institutions in the broad sense are rather undifferentiated –
as ‘social institutions’. If the necessary institutional preconditions are lacking (for
example, sectoral facilities for further training for the purpose of job rotation or
childcare facilities to enable a significant increase in part-time work in Germany)
certain instruments which have been very successful under other labour market
regimes cannot be introduced – or at least not until these preconditions have been
established.
4. Strictly in a strategic perspective the concept attempts, by way of a number of diffe-
rent proposals, not only to achieve a high level of flexibility – above all in the gain-
ful-employment phase – but also to provide this with adequate social security provi-
sions. With this emphasis it seems to rely more on external than internal forms, with-
out, however – as already mentioned – differentiating in respect of their functional
connections. In fact, it makes important contributions to the problem of the transi-
tion between the phases (for example, regulations on flexible partial early retirement
instead of complete early retirement regulations), although it does not deal with
social security issues or emerging social risks in the post-employment phase. This gap
represents a clear disadvantage, especially as both the number and the proportion of
discontinuous – based among other things on part-time and other forms of atypical
employment – periods of gainful employment, due to the progressive tertiarisation
of the economy, as well as the deregulation and flexibilisation of the labour market,
will further increase. This development could lead to long-term problems in relation
to old-age provision. 
Despite these criticisms we accept the following basic principles embodied by transi-
tional labour markets in our further consideration of flexicurity: the creation and sup-
port of transitions between different forms of paid and unpaid employment, in respect
of which the principle of the reversibility of decision-making should hold; socially pro-
tected redistribution of available jobs; and the improvement of ‘employability’ and
‘adaptability’.
Strengthening of internal flexibility: employment-protecting collective
bargaining and working time policy
If one assumes that an enterprise must have at its disposal a certain degree of flexibil-
ity in order to be able to react to external market changes quickly and at a reasonable
Flexicurity: the German trajectory
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cost, there are, as already explained, forms of both external and internal flexibility. What
forms of flexibility are effective can ultimately only be determined by experience. It may
be observed that, by international comparison, internal flexibility has been highly valued
in Germany5. Especially since the 1990s, actors at the sectoral as well as the enterprise
level have expanded the scope of internal flexibility and have introduced new instru-
ments of adjustment (for example, enterprise alliances for jobs, opening clauses in col-
lective agreements). The new possibilities can partly substitute external flexibility and so
provide employees with a higher degree of employment security (Mauer and Seifert
2001). In this connection the following pointers are particularly important: 
1. Since the mid-1980s the parties to collective agreements have gradually expanded 
the scope for variable forms of working time. On this basis enterprises were able to
introduce various types of working time accounts. In contrast to uniformly distrib-
uted normal working time they make it possible to adjust working time in accordance
with fluctuations in external markets, without giving rise to higher costs for overtime
or the recruitment and on-the-job training of additional workers, or, on the other
hand, for their dismissal (Seifert 2001). 
2. Following the model of the employment-protecting reduction in working time 
(four-day week) agreed at Volkswagen in 1993 many collective agreements have
made it possible, within the framework of opening clauses, to diverge from agreed
standards in respect of both working time and earnings (Bispinck 2001). As with
working time accounts enterprises can adjust – quickly and at reasonable cost – the
volume of labour in the case of declining capacity utilisation in accordance with the
principle of the ‘atmende Fabrik’ or ‘factory pausing for breath’ (Hartz 1996). Thus,
forms of internal flexibility can here either supplement or substitute those of exter-
nal flexibility.
As a rule, internal-numerical adjustment presupposes, as empirical research indicates
(Bellmann et al. 1996: 42), internal-functional flexibility. Reductions in working time in
order to save jobs are combined with transfers within or partly even between firms
which, however, presuppose appropriate skills. Based on the high proportion of workers
with vocational training, in all likelihood different working tasks can be covered within
the firm (internal-functional flexibility). 
Internal flexibility can, in comparison with external flexibility, offer advantages to both
employers and employees. Firms avoid dismissal and reemployment costs which they
would otherwise incur; maintain team productivity, in contrast to dismissals; and ensure
the amortisation of investments in human capital. Employees can keep their jobs includ-
ing their enterprise-specific human capital in the case of cyclical or seasonal fluctuations
Berndt Keller and Hartmut Seifert
5 In Germany enterprises (84%) react more strongly than in other European countries (70%
on average) to capacity fluctuations with working time adjustments. On the other hand, only 35%
of German companies resort to adjusting the number of employees as against a European aver-
age of 40% (European Commission 2001). These findings substantiate earlier research results in
Germany (Bellmann et al., 1996: 42). 
in demand, and in that way enhance their chances of participation in enterprise-speci-
fic further training and technical as well as organisational development. In addition,
they avoid fluctuation costs. Greater employee stability, however, comes at the price of
temporarily reduced earnings and/or uneven distribution of working time. 
The strengthening of internal flexibility is more suited to solving seasonal or cyclical
employment problems, while transitional labour markets aim also at the solution of
structural problems. To that extent they can supplement one another, even if they partly
represent two different points of view. In contrast to the idea of transitional labour mar-
kets internal flexibility approaches also take into account business-policy interests and
goals. Internal-numerical flexibility reduces the risk of redundancies but can give rise to
earnings problems which become more serious the lower the wage level. If this model is
adopted on a long-term basis it can therefore result in problems for pensions provision. 
For this reason it may arise that the internal flexibility approaches might not meet with
the acceptance of those employees occupied in the low-wage sector, or in companies
with a high proportion of part-time employees.
Strengthening of functional flexibility: lifelong learning
If in the future employment becomes more unstable, and at the same time more self-
responsibility is demanded of employees, the concept of lifelong learning offers ways of
safeguarding and improving the adaptability of employees. This fits in with the
European Commission’s current debate on improving ‘employability’. This approach
relies less on the safeguarding of a given workplace (job security) than on individual
employment capabilities in both internal and external labour markets. At the same time,
it represents one of the four pillars of the coordinated European Employment Strategy
under the employment chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty (Keller 2003a). 
Conceptual debate concerning the application of lifelong learning has yet to get off the
ground. The actors gathered under the ‘Alliance for Jobs’ – federal government, employ-
ers’ associations, and trade unions – proposed the establishment of long-term accounts
in which time credits can be saved for vocational training. The important policy question
of what resources shall be available in respect of these time elements, reserved for learn-
ing purposes, remains open. The initial considerations concern the outlining of an
approach to learning-time accounts which will constitute the organisational basis for
lifelong learning as far as time is concerned (Seifert 2002). As a first step existing legal,
collective agreement and enterprise-specific leave rights should be combined. They
should form the basis of individual learning-time accounts. Future collective agree-
ments, as recently in the chemical industry, should include further time elements. 
Learning-time accounts, which provide a minimum level of leave for vocational training
for all employees, would reduce the risks of unstable employment and at least provide
initial conditions promoting mobility and flexibility on the labour market. This would
improve the chances of groups which have so far been largely excluded from enterprise-
TRANSFER 2/04 235
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specific training (part-time employees, fixed-term employees, the poorly qualified) to
prepare themselves for new jobs, above all in the external labour market. Improved
access rights will not, however, automatically mean the end of selective training. 
Reform of provision for old age: flexible entitlements or basic provision
The fourth element of our concept of flexicurity is not directly linked to the different
forms of flexibility, but leads beyond it. Of fundamental significance for what follows is
the distinction between social security provisions during the period of employment,
which is what we have looked at so far, and social security provisions afterwards, which
is what we shall look at now. In this way we shall expand the existing range of concepts. 
Social problems in the post-employment phase may in future arise as a consequence of the
flexibilisation of employment forms since in Germany the standard employment contract
(Normalarbeitsverhältnis) and social security systems – disregarding a few exceptions such
as considering the period of bringing up children as a compensation mechanism – are still
relatively closely linked (principle of equivalence). In fact, the share of employees out of all
dependent employees who are liable to contribute to social security in the social security
pension insurance scheme has fallen in the last 20 years from around 85% to 80% (BMA
2000)6. However, there is still nothing on the necessary level of protection for independ-
ent subsistence. Despite the existence, in principle, of the social security system it could
by all means lead in the medium or long term to poverty in old age or to claims for social
assistance when the insurance basis is too narrow due to changes in form of employment
(for example, part-time work or exclusively short-time employment during a significant
part of the gainful employment phase or in the case of longer and/or repeated interrup-
tions of employment as a result of unemployment).
Problems will arise for pension provision when no other incomes (for example, capital
incomes or life insurance) can be obtained or no combination with other pensions (for
example, survivor’s or enterprise pension) arranged. These problems of atypical employ-
ment, which, in contrast to those of demographic change (shift in the population age
structure), are seldom addressed in the current discussion, will in future increase, since
there is likely to be further differentiation or heterogeneous forms of employment
career. Answers to these problems can be sought in two different directions, namely
through the concept of flexible entitlements currently being developed or through the
already existing concept of basic provision. One more recent concept concerning flexi-
ble entitlements for intermittent periods of insurance contributions, will reorganise or
modernise the social security scheme in order to increase the ‘flexibility’ of employees,
as well as to create the ‘adaptability’ for structural change (Langelüddeke et al. 1999;
Rabe and Langelüddeke 1999)7. According to this proposal the continuity of gainful
Berndt Keller and Hartmut Seifert
TRANSFER 2/04236
6 This decline is essentially due to the rearrangement of statistics on the gainfully employed, 
which includes employees who are exempt from compulsory insurance more strictly. 
7 The present system relies basically on two parameters, the length of employment and the 
level of income. The longer the total period of employment and the higher the earnings the 
higher the pension.
employment should no longer be rewarded, as hitherto; instead, more individual incen-
tives for the necessary flexibility and mobility ought to be created through the extension
of pension credits for periods with low or missing income. The core idea of this propos-
al is as follows: ‘each insured person can be credited with up to five years as flexible enti-
tlement periods, with which he or she can close up gaps in their individual career of
employment. Regardless of the reason for the gap the flexible entitlement period will be
assessed as if the insured person has had average earnings’ (Langelüddeke et al. 1999:
10). Periods of employment with below average contributions can be topped up by
means of the new form of entitlement.
Gaps in the individual ‘employment biography’ would no longer lead to clear deficits in
social security provisions, regardless of the reason for it (such as raising children or fur-
ther training). Those who would benefit most from such adaptations to non-permanent
employment careers would be women, whose still existing gender-specific disadvantages
would be diminished, if not eliminated, and for whom the aim will be an independent
old-age provision instead of the derived claims hitherto in place. Distribution effects –
which are very much intended – in favour of insured persons with interrupted periods of
employment and phases of low earnings would thereby result in all current pensions or
pension entitlements becoming ‘a little lower’ in value.
We take the concept of basic provision as an alternative approach for two reasons: 
1. It can strengthen individual incentives to leave the labour market temporarily 
and/or partly (through part-time work) for various reasons and create positive exter-
nal effects in the sense of employment opportunities for the unemployed, since in
contrast to current regulations only limited disadvantages in the post-employment
period result from this, namely in relation to pension level. 
2. It supplements the hitherto open social security elements, not covered in other 
proposals, of flexicurity in the post-employment phase. It should reduce the risk of
possible old-age poverty resulting from long-term atypical employment and guaran-
tee independent provision, not derived from the (male) ‘breadwinner’. 
The basic future alternative for policy-making goes far beyond a narrow labour market
perspective, though it is none the less closely linked with it. One option is the retention
of the current, in international comparison extensive and relatively strict, coupling of
gainful employment and social security provisions, the other the more or less extensive
decoupling. Recognition of the need for re-regulation implies a priori no decision in
favour of a pure basic provision or a combination of social security, enterprise-based
models and purely voluntary private provision. 
These strategies can also, as in Switzerland’s universal system, be combined. The central
idea is this: it is meaningful on employment policy grounds for the continuing reform
debate on the future of pension provisions to take into account, alongside the demo-
graphic aspects, the changes in the employment system due to the introduction of
elements of basic provision sketched here. 
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Countries with other institutional arrangements, without the fairly close coupling of the
standard employment contract and social security provisions typical of Germany and
built on models of basic provision not linked to labour market activity (as in the
Netherlands or Switzerland), have less need to take action in this connection. In con-
crete terms: the strong increase in part-time employment (over 40%) in the Netherlands
was an explicit aim of employment policy; it gives, however, rise to fewer negative exter-
nal effects for old age provision than is the case in Germany under the current legal cir-
cumstances. From the employees’ point of view it is more attractive to change from full-
time to part-time work if long-term negative consequences in the form of drastic reduc-
tions in pensions are not to be expected. 
To this extent the effects of flexibilisation or the consequences of the ‘erosion of the
standard employment contract’ show quite considerable country-specific differences,
which any institutionally oriented analysis must take into account. Incidentally, the
extension of existing basic provision elements (for example, in Switzerland) due to exist-
ing path dependencies should be easier than their introduction. 
Social security and atypical employment
The four components of a supplemented, comprehensive concept of flexicurity discussed
so far constitute a general approach to the social protection of employees, or more pre-
cisely: employees with standard employment contracts. In what follows we shall relate
these four building blocks to different forms of atypical employment (particularly part-
time employment, short-time employment, temporary work, fixed-term employment, new
self-employment) since these are, in comparative perspective, in particular need of social
protection (Zukunftskommission der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1998: 292ff). 
Variants of atypical employment are generally directed towards the extension of flexi-
bility, or more accurately – with the exception of regular part-time work – of forms of
external-numerical flexibility in the sense already defined, through the extension of non-
normal employment. They do, of course, not solve the problems of adequate social
security, in the sense of flexicurity, which arise with its introduction. 
Atypical employment has increased since the early to mid-1980s, not evenly but in the
aggregate (Keller and Seifert 1995), and may now account for around one-third of exist-
ing employment relationships (Schäfer 2001: 20ff), which clearly shows the urgency of
finding solutions. Women account for a disproportionate amount of such employment,
with the sole exception of temporary work, so that the concept of flexicurity here clear-
ly contains a gender-specific component. The trend-wise increase of these forms will
presumably be further strengthened in coming years by changes in the current ‘laws for
modern services on the labour market’ as a consequence of the proposals of the Hartz
Commission (Bericht der Kommission 2002); they rely more on external than on inter-
nal variants of flexibilisation. Their medium- and long-term effects, particularly on the
problem of social security and its financing, can barely be estimated at present. It is quite
likely, however, that they will increase the already existing difficulties (Keller 2003b). 
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We shall explicitly differentiate between atypical and precarious employment: precari-
ousness is here associated with a lower level of social security in comparison with the
standard employment contract in the sense given above, which encompasses both the
employment and the post-employment phases. Our aim is to take away the precarious-
ness from atypical employment relationships, not to eliminate such employment or to
contain it at any price. They can form ‘bridges’ between unemployment and employ-
ment, make ‘Outsiders’ into ‘Insiders’ or at least ‘Entrants’, and to that extent can con-
stitute elements of the concept of flexicurity sketched here. 
We start out from the restrictive premise that with the help of the proposed measures
the risks of atypical forms of work will diminish, but not be fully eradicated. This restric-
tion will last for at least as long as the labour market finds itself severely unbalanced.
The problems of atypical employment which we are about to examine would not be
entirely solved by full employment, although they would be much less serious than under
mass unemployment. With this qualifying remark we would like to preclude any possi-
ble illusions concerning regulation. Changes of legal forms do not automatically lead to
equivalent changes in reality. If one again distinguishes between the phases of employ-
ment and post-employment the risks of the first phase are related to both the level of
income and job security, those of the second phase to pension level
(Zukunftskommission der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 1998: 304ff). Apart from that, atyp-
ical employees are largely excluded from enterprise specific measures of further train-
ing. 
The problems in the employment phase include the fact that forms of atypical employ-
ment cannot provide security of adequate, independent subsistence. This applies partic-
ularly to part-time work in the broad sense, though not necessarily to temporary work.
Problems for the post-employment phase arise above all from the fact that own contri-
butions, by reason of the situation – with low and/or changeable income – cannot be ade-
quate. These already existing difficulties will increase if the supplementary provision
increases in importance. 
(1) Part-time work
Part-time work, which is by far the most prevalent form of atypical employment, has
increased with the integration of women in the labour market; its proportion in
Germany at present is around 25% (including marginal part-time employment, below a
minimum number of working hours per week) which in EU comparison corresponds to
a place in the top third (Europäische Kommission 2003). Part-time employment, which
above all increases internal-numerical flexibility, can, from the employees’ standpoint,
on the one hand be seen as a ‘bridge’ to the labour market (for example, entry or re-
entry; Klammer and Tillmann 2002), and on the other hand become a ‘trap’ in terms of
income. In the case of involuntary part-time work this is already so in the employment
phase and certainly in the post-employment phase, for which general pension claims can
in fact be made, but not at a high enough level for independent subsistence. In the case
of voluntary part-time work not imposed by external – for example, family – exigencies,
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and which lasts over a long period, the income problem can arise in the post-employ-
ment phase. 
The following approaches, which should be regulated both inside and outside the enter-
prise, promise to improve the socio-economic situation of part-time employees:
 Transitions in the form of employment bridges (in the sense of the concept of tran-
sitional labour markets) offer entitlement rights to part-time work and a return to 
full-time work in order to have options in changing life and income situations. 
Some rights of this kind excluding, however, the right to re-extend working hours, 
were recently anchored in the Law on part-time work8. 
 General claims to participation in measures of enterprise-specific further training 
within the framework of collective agreements provide opportunities to counter 
decoupling from the internal labour market or its career ladders.
 The concept of flexible entitlements, also that of basic provision, can, in a long-
term perspective, ameliorate or even eradicate the threat of old-age poverty as a 
consequence of low contributions.
(2) Marginal part-time employment 
Short-time employment, a specific variant of part-time work with working time and
income below a certain level (formerly 15 hours or €325), is primarily aimed at increas-
ing internal flexibility. It grew considerably in the 1990s; the Law on the reform of short-
time employment relationships introduced the obligation to make social security contri-
butions in 1999. At the beginning of 2003, when the Hartz reforms were introduced, the
income level was increased to €400 and the hours restriction abolished. These incomes
carry no obligation to make either tax or social security contributions for employees;
employers pay in total 25% social security contributions (12% health insurance, 11%
pension insurance, 2% tax).
In the area of domestic services (cleaning, etc.) so-called mini-jobs have been created
for which private individuals simply pay 12% contributions and can annually deduct up
to €510 from their taxable income. The aim is to reduce illegal employment. Between
mini-jobs and regular part-time employment a new ‘transitional zone’ has been intro-
duced (for monthly incomes of between €401 and €800). Employees pay relatively low,
gradually increasing) social security contributions; employers pay normal contributions.
The aim is to avoid the so-called ‘low-wage trap’9.
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8 Law on part-time and fixed-term employment contracts and towards the amendment and 
abrogation of labour law provisions.
9 Since the introduction of the new regulation regarding mini-jobs there has been a sharp 
increase in this kind of employment. This development mostly results from employees subject 
to compulsory insurance because of regular jobs and doing second jobs, but also from stu-
dents and pensioners. In contrast, however, very few former unemployed persons have been 
employed (Knappschaft 2003).
 Low income remains the critical variable – in so far as it is not a matter of an extra 
income – even after the limits were abolished. This situation can give rise to prob-
lems of securing an independent level of subsistence (‘working poor’), and cer-
tainly generate difficulties in the case of independent old-age provision. A dis-
tinction must be made between main and secondary jobs: if there are existing
claims from another, main job that is subject to social security contributions there 
is no need for further provision, derived from the second one. The real problem 
group consists of those employees who over a long period are engaged exclus-
ively in short-time employment. They will because of the principle of equivalence 
even in the case of a (henceforth inclusive) insurance obligation barely attain
pension claims adequate to ensure material existence10. This fundamental
problem can ultimately be solved only by models of basic provision. 
 The already mentioned Law on part-time work (cf footnote 7) offers transitions to 
subsistence-ensuring regular part-time or full-time work. 
 Claims in respect of further training measures must be organised outside the 
enterprise on account of the specific character of this form of employment (chiefly 
its concentration in a few, frequently small-enterprise based branches of the
service sector).
(3) Temporary work/personal service agencies
Temporary work represents a three-way relationship in contrast to all other forms of
employment: the employee has a regular employment contract with a temporary employ-
ment agency (‘hirer’), but works for a limited time for another company (‘borrower’)
and is under its authority11. It can have a similar ‘bridging function’ to part-time work,
in so far as the hiring firm regards the hiring period as a kind of trial period (‘screening
device’) for a permanent employment relationship. The absolute number of temporary
employment relationships – with barely 1% of all dependent employees – is still low,
nevertheless its growth rates were considerable for many years. At present, all local
employment offices are being fundamentally restructured and transformed into job cen-
tres ‘for all labour market-related services’. All job centres must set up, as new business
units, so-called ‘personal service agencies’ (Personalserviceagenturen or PSAs), charged
with breaking down entry barriers and reintegrating the unemployed in the ‘first’ (or
regular) labour market. PSAs hire out employees to private firms with the aim of getting
them taken into regular employment.
In the case of legal temporary work, which is directed towards increasing external-
numerical flexibility, there are no particular social security or employment risks12. First,
Flexicurity: the German trajectory
TRANSFER 2/04 241
10 A possible scaling up on a voluntary basis of the employer’s overall contribution is rarely 
realised by the employees. 
11 The maximum possible duration of ‘hiring out’ has been increased several times since the 
introduction of the Law on employment promotion in 1985 and currently stands at 24 months. 
12 There is, however, one specific problem. Since the average income for temporary work is 
around 30% below comparable activities (Rudolph and Schröder 1997), income problems for 
those in the low-wage bracket cannot be ruled out. 
the – according to current knowledge (though it is statistically difficult to capture) – con-
siderable misuse of this form of employment has caused employment instability. Above
all, violations of the prohibition on limiting the duration of the employment relationship
with the temporary worker to the first temporary hire to the ‘borrower’ – have been fre-
quent. 
 Old demands for a strict prohibition are diminishing due to rapid expansion of this 
form. A more appropriate strategy is the legal and/or collectively agreed safe-
guarding of income and working conditions in the sense of equal treatment with 
the regular workforce of the hiring company. Here belongs also the socially 
acceptable shaping of remuneration in accordance with the reference wage prin-
ciple, as, for example, in the Netherlands – and independently of the period of hire. 
A first, albeit hesitant step in this direction was the Job-Aqtiv law which intro-
duced this regulation after 12 months and so only for a small proportion of tem-
porary workers. For workers hired out by PSAs there is a collective agreement 
which permits a particular ‘entry’ wage only for the long-term unemployed for a 
limited period. 
 Furthermore, entitlements to further training which are to be legally established 
and/or to be stipulated by collective contracts not only improve individual 
‘employability’, but also help to bridge slack periods for the temporary employ-
ment agency in order to diminish the employment risk and to improve the oppor-
tunities for employment in higher value activities. 
 The external flexibility attained by temporary employment can, incidentally, at 
least partly be substituted by internal flexibility within the framework of employ-
ment-protecting working time reductions, as well as working time account 
schemes (‘factory pausing for breath’ – ‘atmende Fabrik’).
(4) Fixed-term employment 
The usual legal regulations on protection against dismissal naturally do not apply to
fixed-term employment; contracts automatically expire after a determinate period. The
maximum possible period has been increased several times since the mid-1980s and now
stands at 24 months. The proportion of fixed-term employment relationships has
increased only gradually since the mid-1980s – to 10% in 2001, according to the German
microcensus. Fixed terms have a double function. On the one hand, they serve as
‘bridges’ to permanent employment in the form of extended trial periods; on the other
hand, they can also constitute ‘dead ends’. More frequent and longer periods without
gainful employment inevitably lead to problems in terms of level of entitlement to pen-
sions. A further disadvantage lies in the extensive exclusion from enterprise-specific
training measures (including career opportunities) and the lack of severance pay. 
In an effort to limit the extent of fixed-term employment, as in the case of temporary
work, attempts are made to substitute external flexibility by internal flexibility as much
as possible. 
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 Further training measures can bridge periods of inactivity between periods of 
fixed-term employment and must be publicly subsidised since solutions in accor-
dance with the terms of collective agreements ex definitione do not suffice. Job 
rotation models, such as those introduced by the Job-Aqtiv law, create employ-
ment opportunities for the unemployed, at least for limited periods. Thus, they 
improve the ability to rejoin the labour market (in the sense of increasing internal 
flexibility), while they maintain or improve individual human capital. 
 Low entitlements to pensions which arise due to phases of inactivity can be com-
pensated by flexible entitlements within the present system or by a fundamental 
reform towards a basic pension fund. 
(5) Sham self-employment/new self-employment: ‘Me Ltd’ (Ich-AG)
Quantitative data on the extent of this form of atypical employment are scarce; how-
ever, there is good reason to suppose that the number of new self-employed increased
significantly in the 1990s and now encompasses several hundred thousand people
(Dietrich 1999). Alternation between dependent and independent activity, even if only
of a temporary nature, will increase in future (Klammer and Tillmann 2002: 155).
A new (from 2003), provisional form of self-employment is the Ich-AG (‘Me Ltd’) or
Familien-AG (‘Family Ltd.’) (with an annual income of not more than €25 000 or
€50 000), which can be established by unemployed persons. Support services are avail-
able for up to three years. The main aims are to legalise illicit labour through transfer
to regular employment and the promotion of self-employment. 
For the time being, there is a need to formulate criteria which are more operational and
as clear-cut as possible concerning the delimitation of new and real self-employment
(for example, subject to instructions, working for a single customer, employment of an
employee subject to compulsory social security contributions). The current definition
under the Law on the promotion of self-employment (Knospe and Marx 2000) offers
practical starting points.
 While there are a range of forms of help for transitions to self-employment (for 
example, bridging money, credit programmes), whether from unemployment or 
dependent employment, in the case of failure there is a lack of comparable instru-
ments for the reverse direction (above all, further training opportunities).
 Those belonging to the ‘classical’ forms of self-employment (general practitioners, 
lawyers in private practice) are excluded from the collective compulsory social 
insurance system, since they supposedly have the ability, due to their income and 
property situation, to make individual provision in professional insurance sys-
tems13. As a result, at least in respect of pensions, the in practice difficult differ-
entiation between self-employment and sham self-employment is superfluous. 
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13 Problems of the system of social security in general and of its financial sustainability in
particular are beyond the scope of this article.
The ‘new’ self-employed (for example, consultancy activities, franchisees), in con-
trast, should be subject to compulsory insurance since this ‘assumption of afflu-
ence’ on the grounds of their income situation does not exist and so the risk of ‘old 
age poverty’ cannot be definitively ruled out (see, from a legal perspective, Welti 
2001a and 2001b). 
Concluding remarks 
The concept of flexicurity sketched here appears to us well capable – since it links
demands for flexibility with elements of social security – of leading the ongoing deregu-
lation dispute out of its current dead end, and of opening up the public and political dis-
cussion carefully in the direction of a necessary re-regulation, in the sense of an
improvement of social protection. Incidentally, measures for the improvement of flexi-
curity would be easier to implement than those of deregulation since they take greater
account of the different interests of various actors. 
An important argument against the concept of flexicurity developed here is the question
of its translatability or realisability, which has not yet been clarified. However, the given
examples and successes of other western European countries (above all, the
Netherlands and Denmark) show that the approach is able to cope with the realities of
the labour market and pension insurance systems. 
Incidentally, not all the aspects we have discussed must constitute zero-sum games. In
the case of particular approaches (for example, employment-protecting collective bar-
gaining and working time policy, lifelong learning) positive-sum games are very much
possible. A change in the framework conditions not only gives rise to costs, but also pro-
duces both individual and collective benefits for employers and employees. The circle of
corporate actors includes, also during periods of ‘decentralisation’ and transfer of com-
petences from the sectoral to the enterprise level, not only the parties to collective
agreements, but also the state, which recasts framework conditions or changes those that
have become obsolete. What is important is to create options for private actors, not to
put obstacles in their way. 
Finally, the flexicurity approach is not without consequences for the permanent work-
force and so for the future development of the standard employment contract. The
effects arise from the basic philosophy which prefers internal to external flexibility.
Enterprise-specific adaptations through fluctuating work periods, transfers to other
workplaces, or employment-protecting working time reductions are not without conse-
quences for the time, skill-specific, and also financial adaptability of the permanent
workforce. 
On the whole the concept of flexicurity as outlined here redistributes the burden of
adjustment processes. In contrast to external flexibility, internal flexibility places more
claims on the workforce within the enterprise and lessens the challenge on the
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mutually supporting contributors to unemployment insurance: the enterprise and
employees with social security obligations. The challenge to labour market policy is the
organisation of transitional labour markets. The costs which are incurred can (at least
partially) be balanced against savings in unemployment contributions, and the
employer also sees an improvement in efficiency when sub-optimal employment can be
avoided. At the same time higher income can be realised for employees if they manage
to achieve a friction-free transfer to the new order of structural change on the labour
market. Costs are incurred when a basic level of social protection is introduced which in
turn makes certain forms of external flexibilisation attractive and so enlarges the scope
for adjustment within the firm. 
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